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Promoting Recycling: Private Values, Social Norms, and
Economic Incentives
By W. Kip Viscusi, Joel Huber, and Jason Bell*
increasingly prominent generally (see Thomas
C. Kinnaman 2006), and plastic water bottle
recycling is at the forefront of many recycling
policy initiatives. Plastic water bottle recycling
is of tremendous practical importance, as US
sales of bottled water have grown rapidly, from
around 20 billion bottles in 1997, to 36 billion
in 2006, reaching 50 billion in 2008. This comprises nearly half of all polyethylene terephthalate bottles, and in 2006 accounted for more than
2 million tons of incinerated or landfill waste.
Five states (California, Connecticut, Hawaii,
Maine, and Oregon) have enacted bottle deposit
laws for plastic water bottles, and such deposit
legislation has been proposed or is pending in
other states.
Economic incentives enter the consumer’s
recycling decision through the financial rewards
for the return of their bottles for deposit and
through laws and policies that alter the monetary and convenience costs of recycling. Factors
unrelated to time and money costs also are present, as people may choose to recycle because of
personal attitudes or because of their perception
of social norms toward recycling. To capture the
influence of personal values, we use data on personal attitudes toward the environment. Our data
include unique empirical measures regarding
the degree to which one values socially acceptable behavior in others compared with whether
one believes others value that behavior. We will
show that the private values reflected in becoming upset at neighbors not recycling are far more
predictive of a person’s behavior than the external norms reflected in their beliefs about what
their neighbors might think of them.
We model the disposal mode for waste as a
binary choice. Consider a decision between
returning a bottle for deposit or disposing of
it in the garbage. Once a person has chosen a
disposal mode for that bottle, it will usually be
desirable to continue to use that mode for additional bottles, producing a corner solution in
terms of the recycling decision. We begin here
with a simple theoretical model for returning

Individual behaviors that benefit the environment are potentially influenced by personal
values of environmental quality, social norms
that encourage proenvironmental actions, and
economic incentives. Economic incentives often
loom particularly large, including those that
result from environmental policies. Less well
understood are the respective roles of private
values and social norms. Do people undertake
proenvironmental actions more out of their personal valuations of the environment that might
be characterized as warm glow effects or from
the social norms that reinforce proenvironmental behaviors?
The least explored component of these determinants of proenvironmental behavior is that of
social norms. We characterize social norms in
terms of what is normatively appropriate rather
than what is the conventional mode of behavior. There is a burgeoning economics literature
modeling social norms, but not a commensurate
empirical investigation of their practical importance. If norms do matter, what is the respective
role of personal norms that a person imposes on
others compared with the external norms that
people perceive are imposed on them by others?
To what extent are these social norms the result
of legal regimes and regulatory policies that
establish standards for behavior? Our empirical
analysis estimates the role of these influences.
The empirical case study for this article is
based on an analysis of recycling of plastic
water bottles. Recycling policies are becoming
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bottles for deposit versus disposing of them in
the garbage. The conceptual structure is similar
for other forms of recycling such as curbside,
but those modes do not include a financial payoff for bottle returns.
Let each disposal mode have an associated
fixed cost as well as a unit disposal or return
cost per bottle. The cost of returning bottles for
deposit is (td0
   + td1
   n) w, where td0 is the fixed
time cost, td1 is the unit time cost per bottle, n
is the number of bottles returned, and w is the
opportunity cost of time given by the wage
rate. Similarly, disposing of bottles in the garbage has an analogously defined time cost of
(tg0  + tg1
   n) w. Returning bottles for deposit also
yields a deposit refund payment p per bottle.
The disposal decision also entails nonpecuniary components. The overall nonpecuniary
benefit b that the person derives per bottle that
is recycled depends on components that reflect
both private values and social norms. We denote
the warm glow environmental valuation component that recyclers receive by e, as individuals
may derive utility from taking proenvironmental actions. Returning bottles for deposit may
also enable the person to feel virtuous or morally superior to neighbors, based on personal
norms, which we denote by v. Failing to recycle
bottles may produce environmental guilt if they
believe that they are not behaving in a way that
is consistent with external norms for acceptable behavior. Thus, there is a per bottle unit
green guilt cost c of throwing the bottles away
in the garbage. There also may be an income
elasticity associated with environmental benefit valuations, which we expect to be positive if environmental quality is a normal good.
The nonpecuniary benefit per bottle returned
is b(e, v, w), and the external norm guilt cost c
enters negatively in the disposal decision.
The choice to return bottles for deposit will be
preferable to garbage disposal if
(1)

b(e, v, w)n − (td 0  + td1  n)w + pn

> − cn − (tg0
   + tg1  n)w.

If the household already uses both disposal
modes so that fixed costs can be excluded, the
bottle return condition becomes
(2)

b(e, v, w) + c + p > td1
   − tg1.
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The unit value of the private benefits stemming
from environmental valuations, virtue, and the
value of the averted guilt, plus the bottle deposit
amount, must exceed any increase in the unit
bottle time costs due to returning bottles for
deposit as compared to disposal in the garbage.
Given the assumed linear structure of the recycling decision, it is straightforward to show, as
in Viscusi et al. (forthcoming), that if it is desirable to recycle n bottles then it will be desirable
to recycle n + 1 bottles. Thus, one would expect
the distribution of recycling amounts to be characterized by corner solutions in which people
tend either not to recycle at all or to be diligent
recyclers. There should be few households that
are in the intermediate category of recycling a
moderate amount. This discontinuous response
is reflected in the recycling patterns documented
in Viscusi et al. (forthcoming).
To examine the determinants of recycling
decisions, we use an original dataset consisting
of 608 households from our 2009 US survey of
recycling behavior. The data are from a Webbased survey administered to the Knowledge
Networks panel. The particular sample analyzed
is the subsample of bottled water users from a
nationally representative sample of households.
Based on the resident’s state and the time period,
variables for state recycling and deposit laws
were matched to each respondent.
The empirical analysis permits assessment of
the degree to which people gravitate to corner
solutions as well as the influence of each of the
components of the decision. In particular, our
dataset provides information on the number out
of every ten plastic water bottles that the household reports recycling. This information is at
the individual household level, which is more
refined than in previous studies.
Several variables capture the cost components
of recycling. We measure the value of time costs,
w, using the level of household income. Time
costs also will be influenced by the amount of
time involved and the convenience of recycling.
Chief among the potential influences on the time
cost is the stringency of state recycling law that
is in place. Ranked in order of stringency are
the 14 states (plus Washington, DC) that have
laws requiring mandatory recycling or provide
an opportunity for recycling, the 15 states that
require the development of a recycling plan,
the 6 states that specify a recycling goal but
otherwise do not impose requirements, and the

VOL. 101 NO. 3

Promoting Recycling: Private Values, Social Norms, and Economic Incentives

15 states with no recycling law at all. With more
stringent laws, the availability of recycling locations tends to rise, increasing the ease and reducing the time cost of recycling. These laws in turn
affect the availability of recycling opportunities,
as shown by Bell, Huber, and Viscusi (2010).
State deposit laws affect recycling time costs
and the monetary payoff. If there is a deposit
law covering plastic water bottles, then there is
a payment p per bottle returned. However, even
a deposit law that does not cover water bottles
might boost recycling rates by leading people to
visit a recycling center for their other bottles and
cans, thus lowering the fixed time cost component
associated with recycling plastic water bottles.
A distinctive aspect of our data is the inclusion
of detailed information about the nonpecuniary
aspects of the recycling decision that affect the
value of b(e, v, w). The warm glow environmental benefit measure of e is captured by the variable
for whether the respondent considers himself or
herself to be an environmentalist. This variable
is more influential than whether the respondent
belongs to a national environmental organization,
although as shown in Viscusi et al. (forthcoming),
that measure, too, has a positive effect on recycling behavior. Overall, 42 percent of respondents
describe themselves as being environmentalists.
The social norm attitudes are less prevalent,
as 68 percent of the sample express neither a private value nor the perception of an external norm
for recycling. The variable we use in the analysis
to capture the respondent’s private value associated with recycling is a 0-1 dummy variable
for whether the respondent would be upset with
neighbors if they did not recycle.1 The share
of respondents indicating such a private norm
was 28 percent of the sample. The analogous
measure of the cost of external norm c is a 0-1
dummy variable for whether the respondent’s
neighbors would be upset with someone who
did not recycle.2 Only 16 percent of the sample
1
Our characterization of social norms is different from
that of Bente Halvorsen (2008), who considers a cluster of
effects relating to norms and attitudes generally. Her variable pertaining to the respondent generally liking “to do
what I want others to do” is closer to our characterization
of social norms.
2
The survey asked respondents their opinions about several statements on a five-point scale: strongly disagree, disagree, no opinion, agree, and strongly agree. For whether the
respondent would be upset, the text was: “I would be upset
if I noticed someone in my neighborhood putting recyclable
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acknowledged such an external norm, with
three-fourths of this group also voicing a private
value of recycling behavior. Thus, there is little
evidence of concern with external norms in the
absence of private values. Higher income levels,
which is our measure of the opportunity cost w of
recycling, are expected to have a positive effect
on b(e, v, w) if there is a positive income elasticity of the demand for environmental quality.
The discontinuous nature of recycling decisions is borne out in the sample distribution
of the number of bottles out of ten that people
recycle. The percent of nonrecyclers, those who
indicated they did not recycle at all, is 6 percent for states with water bottle deposit laws,
17 percent for states with deposit laws that do
not cover water bottles, and 35 percent for states
with no deposit law. By contrast, the intermediate category of recycling amounts is not sensitive to the recycling regime, which is what we
predict based on economic theory. The distribution of respondents in the 1–7 out of 10 bottles
category is 12 percent for states without deposit
laws, 13 percent for states with deposit laws that
do not include plastic water bottles, and 7 percent for states with deposit laws including plastic water bottles. The percentage of respondents
who recycle 8–10 out of 10 bottles is 53 percent
for states without deposit laws, 69 percent for
states with deposit laws that do not include plastic water bottles, and 87 percent for states with
plastic water bottle deposits. Thus, the presence
of deposit laws does not increase the percentage of recyclers in the intermediate category, but
rather shifts the mass of the distribution to the
diligent recycler group.
These results are also true more generally.
Controlling for state laws and a detailed set of
individual and regional characteristics, effective recycling laws and water bottle deposits
generate a discontinuous shift in behavior, transforming nonrecyclers into diligent recyclers.
The regression estimates in Table 1 permit the
analysis of the respective role of private v alues,
social norms, and economic incentives. The
materials into the garbage.” For whether neighbors would
be upset, the text was: “Other people in my neighborhood
would be upset if they noticed someone putting recyclable
materials into the garbage.” For our analysis, the personal
and external social norm variables take on a value of one if
the respondent agreed or strongly agreed with the statement
and zero otherwise.

68

MAY 2011

AEA PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS
Table 1—Regressions Predicting Number of Plastic Water Bottles Recycled

Neighbors would be upset if someone
put recyclables in garbage
Respondent would be upset if neighbors
put recyclables in garbage
State has deposit law that does not cover
water bottles
State has deposit law covering water bottles

Number of bottles
recycled out of 10
(OLS)

State has mandatory recycling or provides
an opportunity to recycle
State requires a recycling plan
State requires a recycling goal
Considers self environmentalist
Income/10,000

0.3977
(0.3885)
1.9946***
(0.3686)
1.0582**
(0.4891)
2.5100***
(0.3526)
2.6753***
(0.4798)
1.1786**
(0.4843)
−0.0469
(1.0861)
1.2092***
(0.3358)
0.0946**
(0.0379)

Number of bottles
recycled out of 10
(Tobit)
1.4005
(1.7130)
7.3378***
(1.5020)
3.6389**
(1.7309)
9.3815***
(1.6626)
9.0396***
(1.6309)
3.1273**
(1.5156)
−0.6988
(3.3511)
4.8764***
(1.1723)
0.3124**
(0.1378)

Ordered probit
(8–10, 1–7, 0 bottles
out of 10)
0.2530
(0.1949)
0.7766***
(0.1600)
0.3145*
(0.1705)
0.9531***
(0.1794)
0.8065***
(0.1553)
0.2653*
(0.1460)
−0.0229
(0.3396)
0.4334***
(0.1189)
0.0421***
(0.0144)

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The R2 for the OLS equation is 0.2659. Regressions include a highest income
category variable and a constant in the OLS and Tobit runs.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.

three columns of estimates report OLS and Tobit
results for the number recycled out of every
10 bottles used, and ordered probit results for
diligent recyclers who recycle 8–10 out of 10
bottles, intermediate recyclers who recycle 1–7
out of 10 bottles, and nonrecyclers who recycle
0 out of 10 bottles. Since the signs and statistical significance of the variables are similar, we
focus here on the first column of OLS estimates.
Private valuation of the environment as reflected
in whether the respondent is a self-described
environmentalist boosts recycling by an average
of 1.2 out of 10 bottles. The social norm variable reflecting one’s potential guilt with respect
to neighbors’ attitudes if one does not recycle
is not statistically significant. By contrast, registering a private value toward recycling boosts
returns by 2.0 out of 10 bottles. Thus, the internal private value is critical in promoting recycling, while the external norm is not.
It is important to speculate on why the internal
value may be so much more important than the
external one. The importance of the private norm
is easy to understand. It would be inconsistent
if not hypocritical to be upset with n eighbors’

failure to recycle if one did not recycle oneself. By contrast, the external norm has no such
behavioral link. Particularly in today’s individualistic climate, it is reasonable for a person to
acknowledge that his or her failure to recycle
will upset neighbors and still not do it. Ignoring
a neighbor’s response is particularly reasonable
if one’s neighbors are unlikely to see the transgression, or if the transgressor gains utility from
upsetting those neighbors. In any event, our data
are consistent with the conclusion that substantial changes in recycling are unlikely to derive
from perceived external pressure. However, the
various recycling law variables may capture, in
part, reciprocity effects whereby recycling by
others influences one’s recycling behavior.
Neither private values nor social norms are
more influential than the combined effect of
the variables that capture the role of economic
incentives. Plastic water bottle deposit laws
boost recycling amounts by 2.5 out of 10 bottles. States with deposit laws that do not cover
water bottles also increase recycling, though by
less than half as much as in states where p lastic
water bottles are included. The most effective
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Table 2—Probit Regressions Predicting Social Norms of Recycling
Respondent would
be upset if neighbors put recyclables
in garbage
State has deposit law that does not
cover water bottles
State has deposit law covering
water bottles
State has mandatory recycling or
provides an opportunity to recycle
State requires a recycling plan
State requires a recycling goal
Considers self environmentalist
Income/10,000
Regional variables

Respondent would
be upset if neighbors put recyclables
in garbage

0.0637
(0.0599)
0.1213**
(0.0541)
0.1503**
(0.0627)
0.0262
(0.0577)
−0.0611
(0.1124)
0.3050***
(0.0375)
0.0152***
(0.0047)
No

−0.0083
(0.0656)
0.0724
(0.0704)
0.1139*
(0.0652)
0.0303
(0.0594)
−0.0729
(0.1063)
0.3088***
(0.0376)
0.0159***
(0.0047)
Yes

Neighbors would
be upset if someone
put recyclables in
garbage
−0.0062
(0.0462)
0.1217***
(0.0462)
0.0624
(0.0513)
0.0045
(0.0470)
0.0288
(0.1110)
0.0939***
(0.0305)
0.0069*
(0.0036)
No

Neighbors would
be upset if someone
put recyclables in
garbage
−0.0571
(0.0410)
0.0693
(0.0558)
0.0229
(0.0500)
0.0201
(0.0477)
−0.0041
(0.0925)
0.0972***
(0.0303)
0.0068*
(0.0036)
Yes

Notes: Coefficients have been transformed to equal marginal effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions
include a high income category variable. The regional variables are for three census regions and whether the respondent lives
in an SMSA.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.

recycling laws require mandatory recycling or
an opportunity to recycle, followed by those
requiring a recycling plan. These laws boost
recycling rates with effects as high as 2.7 bottles
out of 10 for the most stringent laws.
In terms of demographics, higher income levels
boost recycling rates. Although the opportunity
costs of recycling rise with income, which should
decrease recycling rates, the observed positive
influence of income indicates that there is a positive income elasticity of demand for the environment that offsets the role of income in raising the
opportunity costs of recycling. The net result is
that there is a slight increase in recycling at higher
income levels. Income levels also have an interactive effect as they affect the relative attractiveness of different recycling modes. Viscusi et al.
(forthcoming) find that bottle deposits are less
influential in boosting recycling rates at higher
income levels, and Bevin Ashenmiller (2009,
2010) finds that bottle deposits are a significant
income source for the poor.
Based on these results it is possible to calculate the monetary equivalent of private values

and perceived social norms. Plastic water bottle
deposits are 5 cents per bottle. Based on the
effect of the variables relative to that of the
plastic water bottle deposits variable, the warm
glow benefit of recycling has an economic value
of about 2.5 cents per bottle, and private values
that reflect becoming upset at others’ failure to
recycle have a value of about 4 cents per bottle.
To determine whether the norms variables
themselves are affected by the laws and regulations, Table 2 reports probit estimates of
the determinants of whether the respondent
would be upset if neighbors didn’t recycle, as
well as whether the respondent believes neighbors would be upset if people did not recycle.
The first pair of regressions does not include
regional characteristic variables. So, excluding
these influences, residents of states with plastic water bottle deposit laws do express greater
concern with both the personal value for virtue and the perceived external social norm for
green guilt. There is also a positive effect on
the internal social norms of the most stringent
recycling law variable, which pertains to states
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that have mandatory recycling or provide the
opportunity to recycle. That the most stringent
bottle deposit variable and the most stringent
recycling law variable influence social norms,
but the less stringent ones do not, is consistent
with the external perceptions of norms being
influenced by policies that establish standards
of behavior. However, the inclusion of a set of
four broad regional variables in the final pair of
regressions in Table 2 makes the policy effects
insignificant, with the exception of the positive
effect of mandatory recycling laws on personal
norms. Thus, the influence of laws and deposit
policies appears to be due largely to broad
regional effects.
In contrast, the effect of private values
remains strongly influential, even after including the regional variables. People who consider
themselves to be environmentalists have a 0.31
higher probability of expressing a personal norm
and a 0.10 higher probability of expressing an
external social norm. Higher income levels,
likewise, have a statistically significant positive
effect in each instance, with the point estimate
of the effect of income being more than twice
as great for personal norms as compared to
external social norms. In conjunction with the
relatively greater effect of personal norms than
external norms on recycling behavior shown in
Table 1, the nonpecuniary determinants of the
recycling decision are personal beliefs and attitudes as well as personal norms, which in turn
are influenced by private values.
Although private values and social norms
matter, the policy levers that can be manipulated—bottle deposits and recycling laws—
potentially have a powerful effect on recycling

rates. Because of the discontinuous nature of the
recycling decision, the results of these policies
are often dramatic, as they transform individual
households from nonrecyclers to diligent recyclers. However, individual attitudes with respect
to both the environment and actions that others
should take are influential as well. Perceptions
of how others will perceive a household’s environmental behaviors matter less.
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